In 1957 according to the President of Pakistan, the U.S. Military aid amounted to 40percent on the Pakistan Budget. He did not explain whether this was 40percent of the revenue Budget or of revenue and capital together. A year later when opposition parties began to criticize the government for being tied to the apron-strings of the U.S.A., James M.Langley then U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan, disclosed that the amount of economic aid to Pakistan was twice per capita compared to all the aids and loans given by the U.S. to India, that economic aid to Pakistan worked out to four times per capita the aid and loans the U.S. had given to India.
It is thus clear, whatever the Pakistan leaders might say, the quantum of the military aid which their country has received from the U.S.A. can only be described as massive in relation to Pakistan’s size and requirements. All this aid is outright gift.
The quantum of this aid is also indicated by the many directions in which Pakistan’s military strength has been developed. An extensive programmed of communications including roads, railways and a radar warning network was put through. Existing Air Ports and acrodromes like the one at Khartan, were built. The port of Ormara was developed. The U.S. set up its communication bases near Peshwar and in the northern territories of Kashmir under Pakistan’s unlawful occupation. The united state supplied Patton tanks, F-86 jet fighters, and subsequently F-104 fighter aircraft as well as air.to.air missiles and other sophisticated weapons.
From the United Kingdom, Pakistan received ships and naval equipment on loan. Five and a half divisions of its army were reorganized and equipped on the American system.l One of the problems on which CENTO powers concenterated was subversion and infiltration, and this would explain the massive scale on which Pakistan was able to organize and deploy infiltration across the cease-fire line into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965.
India fought a second war with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965, little more than a year after Nehru's death. Pakistan's ruler at the time, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, personally planned Operation Grand Slam, which he hoped would totally cut Kashmir off at its narrow southern neck from India's Punjab.. But India's army was four times larger than Pakistan's, and quickly dispelled the popular Pakistani myth that one Muslim soldier was “worth ten Hindus.”
Operation Grand Slam ground to a halt as soon as India's tanks rolled west across the Punjab border to the environs of Lahore. In three weeks the second IndoPak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.
"The greater the ambition the greater the low."
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